Chomsky 1986 notes that the extraction from N complements exhibits a weaker island effect than that from relative clauses. Within the Barriers framework, CP in 1a is L-marked and it is not a blocking category, while CP in 1b is not L-marked and is therefore a blocking category and transfers its barrierhood to the complex NP. The difference between 1a and 1b is that in 1a CP is a complement of rumor, while in 1b it is an adjunct of child. The leading idea behind this approach is to define maximal projections as barriers relatively in terms of L-marking.
In this squib we will extend the application of L-marking to coreference phenomena.
Consider the following contrast, which shows that the asymmetry between complements and adjuncts is not limited to extraction: (8) Which report [CP that John had stolen] did he submit to the police? The prediction is borne out: coreference is permitted if stolen is transitive, i.e. CP is a relative clause, whereas it is blocked if the verb is intransitive, i.e. CP is a sentential complement.
In light of the fact that extraction is impossible from a PP adjunct, it is a good heuristic strategy, if 4 is correct, to proceed to a case where an antecedent is located in a PP adjunct. The contrast observed so far is theoretically significant in two points. First, the data given so far are not consistent with the generally held view: the depth of embedding of the antecedent affects coreference possibilities, i.e. the more deeply embedded the antecedent is, the more possibility of coreference there is. It is quite evident that coreference is prohibited in 11a, where the antecedent is as deeply embedded as that in 11b.
Second, a discourse principle proposed by Hornstein (1984, fn. 10: 161-2 ) is incapable of accounting for the full range of the relevant phenomena.
(12) a. *Which picture of John did he buy?
b. Which picture that John liked did he buy? He assumes that 12a and 12b are marked as ill-formed by grammar, but that noncoreference is overridden by a discourse principle when an antecedent embedded in S appears to the left of the pronoun. That this misses the important generalization can be seen in 2 and 9, for example: coreference is not allowed in 2a, where the discourse principle is met; noncoreference is overridden in 9b, where the principle is not met.
Before we present a bit more evidence in favor of 4, it is worth while considering the questions which might arise. Why is an adjunct effect absent in 13b and 14b? (16) a.
b.
pose that the index i is assigned to NP* in 16. Condition C is violated in 16b, but not in 16a, since there is NP, NP2i, which c-commands NP* in 16b, dominates the latter.) It follows that John does not get the same index i as he has in 16b, which means that John is not bound by he and coreference is allowed. In 16a, the assignment of the index i to NP* does not induce the Condition C violation, which allows NP* to get the index i and explains that John is bound by he. It should be clear that it is from Condition C, especially the c-command requirement, that 4 is derived. The asymmetry in question is so ubiquitous that one begins to wonder whether anaphors show a similar property. b. ??They bought pictures near each other. In 17b, theorems incorrectly binds each other, whereas in 17b, they correctly binds each other. Recall that proofs, being N, cannot bind the ana-4 It may be better to assume that NP1i gets the same index i as he since the pronoun c-commands the trace of NP1i at S-structure. See 20b for this argument.
phor.5
If our approach is correct, it predicts that coreference is not possible when an R-expression, however deeply embedded in an adjunct, is contained in a (sentential) complement. b The same is true of (i) from Gueron (1984: 145) :
(i) *An article about a book by John, he read in the Times.
due to the fact that traces left by NP-movement are anaphors and have nothing to do with Condition C.
